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Abstract
This research paper examines how foundations—foreign and domestic, public and private,
operating and grant making—engage with Chinese civil society organisations in an authoritarian
political context. In contrast to previous literature, which considers civil society through the lens
of state-society relations, the author contends that in the case of China, civil society-building has
been a foundation-led process.
Following a discussion of conceptual caveats in the nascent field of foundation research, the
author traces how China’s evolving policy framework has influenced the development
trajectories, legal statuses and modes of operation of both foreign and domestic foundations.
The empirical part of the paper focuses on foundation positions, paradigms and power. Based
on 12 in-depth interviews conducted in 2014 with foundation representatives and CSO leaders,
this research reveals how foreign and domestic foundations position themselves vis-à-vis the
party-state, market and civil society; how they understand philanthropy; and how they deal with
the power imbalance in the relationship between grant maker and grantee.
Research findings show that foundations have different value propositions, visions and missions,
as well as different theories of change, which determine their philanthropic approaches. Foreign
and domestic foundation representatives primarily follow a paradigm of conventional charity,
managerial philanthropy, or political philanthropy. Findings from this research raise a number
of pertinent questions about the likely impacts of China’s controversial Overseas NGO Law on
foreign and domestic foundations and their grantees.
Keywords: PR China, INGOs, foundations, policy, Overseas NGO Law, paradigms, charity,
philanthropy, civil society, CSOs.
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Unprecedented wealth accumulation over the past three decades has fuelled
the growth of charity and philanthropy in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
While charitable giving by individuals and families has a long history in China
(Smith, 2009; Tsu, 1912; Zhang & Zhang, 2014: 83), more complex forms of
philanthropy that aim at “longer-term change to benefit a larger and unknown
number of people” (Anheier & Leat, 2002: 163) are both a much more recent
phenomenon and a foreign import. Such philanthropy has its roots in “the
modern, methodical, and self-confident approach of … large-scale US
foundations” (Anheier & Leat, 2002: 39) and can be considered one of the
legacies of international giving to China since 1978. In mainland China, at least
221 international NGOs (INGOs) entered the PRC between 1978 and 2012
(China Development Brief, 2012: 10–11). They now coexist there alongside
5,942 officially registered domestic foundations (Jijinhui zhongxin wang, 2017).
Both foreign and domestic foundations tend to support Chinese civil society
organizations (CSOs) operating in a wide range of issue areas deemed
acceptable to the party-state.
While mainland China is increasingly part of a global system of philanthropy,
no systematic attempts have yet been made to compare and contrast the
contributions of foreign and domestic foundations to philanthropic
development. In this context, philanthropic development is understood to
include foundation activities related to information sharing, institution building,
training and facilitation. In an accumulative fashion, such diverse foundation
activities and agendas help nurture the ecology of a given civil society (Lilja,
2015). In the context of mainland China, a rather broad definition of civil society
as an “intermediate associational realm situated between the state on the one
side and the basic building blocks of society on the other (individuals, families,
and firms), populated by social organizations which are separate, and enjoy
some autonomy from the state and are formed voluntarily by members of
society to protect or extend their interests or values” (White et al., 1996: 3) is
employed. This definition enables researchers to capture the associational
pluralism that has taken place since the reform and opening up process began
in 1978. This research article raises the overarching question of how
foundations—foreign and domestic, public and private, operating and grant
making—are engaging with Chinese CSOs in an authoritarian political context.
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Gaps in the Existing Literature on Chinese Civil Society
Empirical research on the relationship between foundations and Chinese CSOs
has been thin on the ground. In their article on the local corporatist state and
NGO relations in China, Hsu and Hasmath (2014) do not include foreign and
domestic foundations in their analysis. In his critique of transnational civil
society, Jie Chen (2012) limits his discussion primarily to US-based foundations.
In his monograph on social organisations in the PRC, Hildebrandt (2013)
discusses foundations primarily in the context of the availability or absence of
foreign funding. Recent scholarship by Hasmath, Hildebrandt and Hsu on the
GONGOisation of the NGO sector is another example of civil society scholarship
which almost exclusively focuses on the GONGO-party-state relationship
(2016). The three scholars do not account for the significant amount of foreign
funding and capacity building support by foreign experts that modernising
GONGOs—for example the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA)—
have received over the past twenty years. A noticeable exception has been the
work of the Beijing-based civil society think tank China Development Brief
(CDB). Liu Haiying and Shawn Shieh have filled the void by providing up-to-date
news reports and blog posts about recent developments among foreign and
domestic foundations. Their insights into the changing donor landscape in
China, however, are not reflected in published academic research articles on
this subject.
What explains the lack of academic research on the foundation-CSO
relationship? A number of contributing factors can be identified. Civil society
researchers have so far primarily concerned themselves with theory-building.
An over-emphasis on theory has led to a lack of scholarly interest in some of the
practicalities of CSO work in China, especially the challenge of fundraising.
Another explanatory factor lies with Chinese civil society practitioners
themselves. When accepting interviews by researchers, they tend to be
reluctant to talk about their funding sources. They are mindful that conservative
members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are extremely critical of their
dependence on foreign funding, which can be seen from the recently enacted
Overseas NGO Law. To complicate matters even more, foreign and domestic
foundation representatives tend to be tight-lipped about their grant-making
practices in mainland China. In his seminal study of grant-making foundations,
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Joel Orosz (2000: 30) remarked that “many foundations have deliberately
sought to avoid publicity. Reasons for their doing so can range from the laudable
(a desire to do good works quietly without receiving credit) to the questionable
(it’s no one’s business how we choose to do good works).”
The lack of research on foundations can be considered a major shortcoming
of the field of civil society studies. Current civil society research is let down by
an almost exclusive focus on resource-dependent CSOs—which researchers can
easily research—and suffers from a neglect for the central role of resource-rich
foundations, which for the above-mentioned reasons are much harder to
access. To use the language of economics, in the field of civil society, researchers
have so far primarily focused on the supply chain of CSOs carrying out initiatives
for their various funders. This has come at the expense of analysing the
considerable power that foundations wield over their grantees.1 So far, scholars
have interpreted the development of China’s civil society almost exclusively
through the lens of state-society relations. In stark contrast, the author suggests
that from the mid-1990s until the enactment of the Overseas NGO Law in 2017,
civil society building in the PRC should be considered a foundation-led process.
In line with this new analytical framework, this article primarily concerns itself
with grant-making foundations, which like aid agencies, are “committed to
improving people’s lives and expanding their choices. They face similar
challenges in terms of project selection, supervision, and the need to balance
the achievement of immediate targets against the need for long-term capacity
building” (OECD, 2003).
But how can greater transparency about the operations of resource-rich
foreign and domestic foundations be brought about? The author agrees with
Orosz’s (2000: 31) assessment that “foundations should be supporting work of
real public utility, and if they are, the public has a right to know about it.”
1 Focusing on CSOs at the expense of foundations is as if researchers interested in the subject
of supply chain management in China were to focus exclusively on small and medium sized
enterprises and their relationship with the party-state, whilst ignoring the role of multinational
corporations procuring SME products and services. Current civil society research similarly
primarily concerns itself with the relationship between CSOs and the party-state (Hsu &
Hasmath 2014; Teets 2014). The overemphasis on the state in civil society research has been
critiqued by Howell (2012).
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Despite the risks that come along with greater publicity, both foreign and
domestic foundation representatives agreed to be interviewed for this research
paper. Interviewees gave CDB and the Philadelphia-based philanthropic
consultancy, Geneva Global (GG) consent to publish the full English and Chinese-
language transcripts on the CDB website. They now form a repertoire of first-
hand testimonials which researchers can draw on to discern foreign and
domestic foundations’ paradigmatic choices from an emic perspective.
The in-depth interviews, many of which lasted for two hours or more, capture
the self-perception of foundations as articulated by their leading
representatives. In order to analyse the vast amount of qualitative interview
data, the author applied Hinton and Groves’s (2004: 7) heuristic framework of
critical and dynamic choices for aid actors. The author distinguishes between
foreign and domestic foundation representatives which either follow primarily
a traditional charity, managerial philanthropic or political philanthropic
paradigm. This research applies a new and innovative conceptual approach to
studying foreign and domestic foundations operating under authoritarian
conditions. While this article focuses on the PRC, its conceptual framework and
research approach is globally applicable and can help inform a new agenda in
comparative foundation research.
This article is structured as follows. After a discussion of conceptual caveats
in current foundation research, China’s evolving policy framework will be
discussed. In this first part of the paper, the author will show how different
regulatory regimes have influenced the development trajectories, legal statuses
and modes of operation of both foreign and domestic foundations. The second
empirical part of the article focuses on foundation positions, paradigms and
power. Based on 12 interviews, which the author conducted in 2014 with
foundation representatives and CSO leaders, it will be determined how foreign
and domestic foundations position themselves vis-à-vis the party-state, market
and civil society; how they understand philanthropy; and how foreign and
domestic philanthropic foundations deal with the power imbalance in the
relationship between grant-maker and grantee.
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Conceptual Caveats in Foundation Research
A review of the literature on foundations not only reveals a dearth of China-
related empirical case studies, but the few works that are available on the
subject are also let down by a lack of conceptual rigour. Early works by Anthony
Spires (2012) and Holly Fetter (2013) are a case in point. Both scholars have
argued that, due to the funders’ supposed conservative political and economic
agendas, foundations mostly support positions that are acceptable to the
Chinese authoritarian regime rather than those that promote democratic
change. Spires and Fetter share the implicit view that the contributions—or lack
thereof—that foundations make to political development should be a key
measure of their success or failure. Their scholarship implies the existence of
ideal types ranging from apolitical foundations, which are supposedly “well in
tune with the Chinese Party-state’s own political and social agenda” (Spires,
2012: 146), to more politically radical ones that are “willing to take a risk and
fund the grassroots NGOs and individuals that were developing resistance to
the Chinese State” (Fetter, 2013: 64).
In the case of the PRC, the Open Society Institute springs to mind as a
foundation with a very political profile. However, as its founder George Soros
has admitted, his organisation cannot operate in mainland China because of its
openly declared pro-democracy agenda (Yu, 2016). Are all foundations that
operate with at least tacit approval from the CCP therefore apolitical? Spires
(2012: 146) has made the implicit argument that foundations should challenge
the political status quo in more radical ways. The temporary blacklisting of
Oxfam between 2003 and 2008, however, shows that no foundation operating
in the PRC can function without its host. This also applies to foreign and
domestic foundations operating in other non-democratic countries. For this
reason, one should consider the distinction between supposedly apolitical
foundations and politically more radical ones to be misleading at best, or a false
dichotomy at worst. Mono-directional interpretations of the reach and
significance of a foundation’s work are also problematic from a theoretical,
empirical and pragmatic perspective.
From a theoretical perspective, it is possible for a foundation to contribute to
societal self-organisation in the PRC while simultaneously—and probably
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inadvertently—helping to enhance the capacities of the party-state. This
political paradox of foundation-led civil society building is well known to
practitioners. When designing and delivering three major capacity-building
initiatives for Chinese CSOs over the last ten years, the author employed
strategic approaches that addressed the concerns of the Chinese party-state
while at the same time meeting the needs of Chinese civil society stakeholders.
In Civil Society Contributions to Policy Innovation in the PR China, all fifteen
contributors “considered collaborative state–society relations a necessary
precondition for Chinese civil society to gradually extend its reach and
significance” (Fulda, 2015: 10). This is why a key measure of the effectiveness of
a foundation is its ability to foster collaborative state–society relations in the
PRC, thus contributing towards embedding, deepening and broadening the
ecology of civil society. Under continued authoritarian one-party rule, it is
premature to discuss whether funding support for Chinese CSOs leads to the
development of a political society in China. The latter can be understood to
mean a “particular set of institutionalised relationship[s] between state and
society based on the principles of citizenship, civil rights, representation, and
the rule of law” (White et al., 1996: 208–9).
Analytical frameworks that only measure foundations in relation to their
perceived contributions to China’s democratisation are also problematic from
an empirical perspective. None of the foundation representatives interviewed
for this article suggested that his or her foundation was supporting political
transformation in China, but that does not mean they are all apolitical. The
foundations studied here pursue agendas that range from poverty alleviation,
child welfare and environmental protection to philanthropic development. In an
accumulative fashion, such diverse activities help nurture the ecology of a given
civil society. Foundations can thus play a positive role in China by expanding the
space for associational activities, by encouraging public discourse and by
supporting better dialogue between citizens and cadres (Fulda, 2015: 5).
Moreover, they can help build organisational fields that foster “inter-
organisational networks,” promote “particular conceptions of appropriate
action (or field frames),” and enrol “others into a collective project” (Bartley,
2007: 249).
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From a pragmatic perspective, it can be argued that Chinese civil society
practitioners primarily care about the level of inclusiveness of foreign and
domestic foundations—that is, whether or not they provide funding, and if so,
in what form. During years of capacity-building work in the PRC and as a
participant observer, the author witnessed countless examples of Chinese civil
society practitioners complaining about operating foundations that were
unwilling to provide grants to Chinese CSOs. When discussing grant-making
foundations, Chinese civil society practitioners were principally interested in the
degree to which a foundation employed an instrumental and managerial
approach, or whether it was willing to devolve power to CSO grantees based on
the principles of subsidiarity and accountability. Arguably, the role of
foundations is not just contested by the party-state, but also by Chinese CSOs.
As contractual partners of foundations, Chinese CSOs have to protect their
organisational autonomy if they do not want to become too donor-driven. This
aspect of foundation-led civil society building in the PRC, however, has been
woefully under-researched.
This article is thus an attempt to scrutinise foundations by identifying and
commenting on their paradigmatic choices. New and innovative research
approaches are required to capture the self-perceptions of foundations as their
leading representatives articulate them. To this end, this article applies Hinton
and Groves’s (2004: 7) heuristic framework of critical and dynamic choices for
aid actors. Whereas they subsume “non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
bilateral donors, international finance institutions, national governments,
[and] regional and local governments” (Hinton & Groves, 2004: 6) under the
rubric “aid actor”, this article concerns itself primarily with operating and grant-
making foundations in the PRC. Hinton and Groves assert that the “choices
being made and the behaviours displayed will shift at different times and in
different contexts. For example, organizations may prioritize contrasting
philosophical approaches and procedures at various moments in history.
Building relationships with certain actors in the system may be emphasized at
the expense of others, often in line with the perceived balance of power.
Different significance may be given to different methodologies, values and
accountability issues. Shifting organizational and resource pressures will also
influence the choices being made” (Hinton & Groves 2004: 6).
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This heuristic framework helps to distinguish between foundation
representatives who either primarily subscribe to a paradigm of traditional
charity, managerial philanthropy, or political philanthropy. It fills a gap in the
foundation literature and helps explain how foreign and domestic foundations
operate in the PRC under authoritarian conditions. The following discussion
focuses on how foreign and domestic foundations in China have developed
under vastly different regulatory frameworks. The review of their development
trajectories, legal statuses and modes of operation will show that, despite facing
political restrictions, foreign foundations have managed to carve out a niche in
China. Domestic foundations, on the other hand, have been able to thrive due
to an enabling policy environment.
China’s Evolving Regulatory Framework: Political Restrictions, Legislative
Progress?
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, direct funding support for non-
governmental actors was still the exception rather than the rule, regardless of
whether official bilateral and multilateral development agencies or foreign
grant-making foundations provided the aid. At least 221 INGOs entered the PRC
between 1978 and 2012. The majority of INGOs originated in the US (99), Hong
Kong (35) and the UK (27) (China Development Brief, 2012: 10–11). Foreign
foundations entered China in different ways and at different times. In 1979, the
State Council invited the Ford Foundation (FF) to help rebuild China’s higher
education system; it established its own office in Beijing in 1988. The church-
based foundation Misereor, on the other hand, chose to work through partner
organisations in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. It established direct
partnerships with mainland Chinese counterparts in 1995. Oxfam started
working in the PRC in 1987 and set up its first field office in Kunming in 1992
(Oxfam, 2015).
Foreign support for non-state actors began to gather steam in the mid-1990s.
A pivotal moment was the FF’s facilitation of the NGO Forum alongside the
Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995. It ushered in a
new phase of mostly US-based foundations providing small-scale grants to
Chinese grassroots organisations working on women’s issues, poverty
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alleviation and environmental protection. Such funding support for Chinese
CSOs, however, was always “limited to functional issue areas or ‘low politics’”
(Chen, 2012: 30–1). This also partly explains Anthony Spires’s findings on US
funding for civil society projects between 2002 and 2009, whereby “a mere 5.61
per cent went to grassroots NGOs,” while “the ten projects receiving the largest
grants were all government-run ministries, academies, and universities” (Fetter,
2013: 44–5). Chen et al. (2014: 8) suggest that GONGOs, initiated in a top–down
manner, are the main beneficiaries of foreign funding. This suggests that while
foreign foundations have generally been more willing to support Chinese CSOs
than domestic foundations, such foreign funding support has also been limited
in scope.
Since the ascent of the Xi/Li administration in 2012, an increasing number of
oral and written directives aimed at curtailing the spread of liberal democratic
ideas and practices have been issued in China. Document No. 9 is a case in point.
This leaked internal party document was issued by the General Office of the
Central Committee of the CCP (Central Office) in April 2013. It lashed out at
“false ideological trends, positions and activities” (ChinaFile, 2013) ranging from
constitutional democracy to civil society and historical nihilism. Such key
prohibitions also found their way into the orally communicated policy, the
“Seven Don’t Speaks”, in May 2013. This established, alongside others, “civil
society” as a sensitive term (Bandurski, 2013). The thinking inherent in these
policies and directives is also reflected in the Overseas NGO Law, which came
into effect on 1 January 2017. It will require foreign funders to go through what
could be an overly burdensome registration process in order to continue
funding philanthropic activities in China (Fulda, 2016). Given that “the majority
of Chinese grassroots NGOs rely heavily on funding from outside groups” (China
Development Brief, 2013: xix), anxiety about the development of China’s civil
society is understandable. There is palpable concern among many Chinese CSO
practitioners that the remaining funders could retreat if they find it too
burdensome to comply with the proposed regulatory changes. Against the
backdrop of China’s economic rise and the subsequent dwindling of foreign
support (Deng, 2013), Chinese CSOs are in the midst of what Alan Fowler (2003:
13) has called a “beyond-aid scenario”.
The Chinese party-state not only restricted the political space for civil society
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building, but also developed its institutional framework by rewriting the
regulations for foundations in 2004. Prior to this, only a small number of Chinese
domestic foundations existed. A noticeable example was one of “China’s oldest
and most successful charitable organizations” (Wielander, 2013: 71), the Amity
Foundation, which was founded with the help of overseas churches in 1985. The
Amity Foundation has a long track record of disaster relief and has been
“engaged in scholarships and fostering orphans, public health and HIV/AIDS
prevention and treatment, social welfare (including foster care projects and
projects for the hearing impaired, the disabled and the elderly), community
development and environmental protection” (2013: 72). Trail blazers such as
the Amity Foundation showed reform-minded CCP cadres that domestic grant-
making foundations could play an indispensable role in social development.
Subsequent legislative changes in 2004 reflected the need, socioeconomic
potential and political will to let private Chinese foundations play a bigger role.
Members of this new generation of Chinese foundation actors exhibit character
traits that the existing political and legal conditions alone cannot explain. For
example, various contextual factors strongly influence their behaviour towards
domestic civil society actors, including a general lack of trust, the hands-on
approach of successful Chinese entrepreneurs, as well as a specific Chinese
cultural tradition of charity that emphasises generous giving by individuals and
families. While so-called domestic public foundations have existed since the
1980s and 1990s, these mainly consist of organisations “with government
backing and are therefore referred to as GONGOs” (Liu, [2009] 2011: 10). Since
the State Council issued the “Regulations on the Management of Foundations”
in 2004, another type of domestic foundation has emerged—so-called private
foundations, which being unlicensed to raise funds publicly, are also called
“non-public fundraising foundations". According to the China Foundation
Center (Jijinhui zhongxin wang), there are now 1478 public foundations licensed
to engage in public fundraising. The total number of officially registered
foundations in the PRC has risen from 737 in 2004 to 5,942 in June 2017 (Jijinhui
zhongxin wang, 2017). A significant difference between foreign and domestic
foundations can be seen in their modes of operation. Xu Yongguang, chairman
of the NF, made the case that only about 3 per cent of private foundations in
China developed into grant-making foundations (Xu, 2014: 277). Lai et al. (2015:
1091) have similarly criticised private foundations for a lack of “formal linkages
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between China’s growing grassroots NGO community and the country’s new
philanthropic institutions.”
Why should we concern ourselves with philanthropy rather than charity?
While charitable giving in China is an important topic in its own right, charitable
foundations do not play a particularly prominent role in civil society building. As
operating foundations, they implement their own projects and programmes and
do not provide grants for external organisations. Anheier and Leat (2006: 4)
have argued that “the charity approach makes a difference to those lucky
enough to benefit from the service but, taken alone, has no impact beyond
that.” Chinese CSOs are excluded from their activities, further limiting the reach
and significance of charitable foundations. In the case of the PRC, Lai et al.
(2015: 1089–90) discovered that, among their research sample, 73.2 per cent of
domestic private foundations are not yet willing to fund Chinese CSOs, but
instead prefer to operate their own charitable programmes. Foreign
philanthropic foundations, on the other hand, tend to be grant-making
foundations. They are willing to form partnerships with Chinese CSOs that
implement projects and programmes on their behalf. Porter and Kramer (1999)
have argued that foundations “have the potential to make more effective use
of scarce resources than either individual donors or the government. Free from
political pressures, foundations can explore new solutions to social problems
with an independence that government can never have.”
Critical and Dynamic Choices for Foundations as Aid Actors
Recent regulatory changes in China’s philanthropic sector will likely make it
easier for domestic grant-making foundations and Chinese CSOs to engage in
partnerships. China’s new Charity Law is the latest sign of legislative progress
aimed at helping domestic foundations to provide grants to CSOs deemed
acceptable to the CCP (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2016). The
new law is a ray of hope for China’s civil society sector, since it “smooths the
way for nonprofit groups to legally register and raise funds, but it also makes it
legal for groups to exist even without registering. At the same time, it
encourages more giving by improving tax incentives and making it easier for the
wealthy to establish charitable trusts” (Chin, 2016). According to Priscilla Son,
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“China’s new Charity Law will encourage a more sturdy model of contemporary
giving, allowing for more charities to raise funds from the public without a
complex registration system or a need for approval from the supervisory board
and China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs” (The Borgen Project, 2016).
But how do foundation practitioners view the changing regulatory
environment? How do they position their foundations in China’s complex web
of governance? To find answers to these questions, the author conducted a
series of interviews throughout the summer and autumn of 2014. Ten foreign
and domestic foundation representatives agreed to have their interviews
published in English and Chinese. These were the Sino-Ocean Charity
Foundation (SOCF), Robert Bosch Stiftung (RBS), One Foundation (OF), the China
Charities Aid Foundation for Children (CCAFC), the Narada Foundation (NF),
Misereor, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA), the SEE
Foundation (SEE), Save the Children (StC) and Oxfam (see China Development
Brief & Geneva Global, 2015). (For more information about the foundations, see
the appendix.)
The participating grant-making foundations were chosen for their proven
record of accomplishment in supporting China’s nascent civil society. Six of the
featured grant-making foundations (Oxfam, Misereor, NF, OF, SEE, and CFPA)
were mentioned in CDB’s list of the 15 most influential funders for Chinese CSOs
in 2013 (China Development Brief, 2013a: xix–xx). Five of them (NF, CFPA,
Misereor, StC and OXFAM) were also recipients of a CSO-initiated 2013 China
Foundation Rankings Award that same year (Zhongguo jijinhui pingjiabang,
2013: 6). As such, the nine participating grant-making foundations can be seen
as a “best-in-class” selection. The in-depth interviews with their representatives
not only offer insights into a contested state–society relationship between the
Chinese government and grant-making foundations, but also reveal the
complex relationships at work among donors, foundations, CSOs and recipients.
Three additional interviews, with the Chinese operating foundation, the Sino-
Ocean Charity Foundation (SOCF), the GONGO China Association for NGO
Cooperation (CANGO) and the capacity building CSO Huizeren were also
published. While the sample size may seem small, the featured foundations
operate in a wide range of activity fields and allow the author to draw a
comprehensive picture of the changing landscape of grant-makers in China.
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A New and Innovative Research Approach: Making Things Public
Research conducted for this article was inspired by the art exhibition “Making
Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy”, which took place in Karlsruhe in
2005. Exhibition curators Latour and Weibel (cited in Zentrum für Kunst und
Medientechnologie, 2005) pointed out that at “a time in which many people
doubt and despair of politics it is crucial that they should not be fobbed off with
standard political responses to contemporary problems but that the question of
what actually constitutes politics should be raised anew.” The question of what
constitutes politics is also highly relevant for this research, since in China,
foundation representatives have been reluctant to address the political
dimension of their work. The exhibition title “Making Things Public” was the
inspiration to employ a new and highly innovative research approach which not
only contributes to theory building, but also enhances practitioner reflexivity.
In the summer of 2014, the author spent one month in Beijing and visited
foundation offices, conducted the interviews with foundation representatives
and subsequently transcribed, translated—and most importantly—published
the in-depth interviews in the spring of 2015. Prior to authorising the interview
transcript, many foundation representatives obtained feedback from their
colleagues, leading to revisions to the original transcripts. The fact that many
interviews went through various iterations suggests that rather than just
reflecting the views of one individual, the published interviews in fact are highly
reflective of the respective foundation’s shared value propositions.2
When interviewees speak on record they are addressing at least two types of
audiences: a domestic Chinese audience as well as a global audience. In
addition, interviewees are also positioning themselves vis-à-vis other
professionals in the field. The published interviews are of interest to global and
2 The chosen research approach resembles Nicholas Loubere’s systematic and reflexive
interviewing and reporting (SRIR) method. Similar to Loubere, the author “values a plurality of
data, and undertakes data reduction during fieldwork through reflexive and collaborative
dialogue” (2017). In stark contrast, however, the author considers the post-interview dialogue
between interviewer and practitioner to be of key importance. When foundation
representatives answer the semi-structured interview questions, they reflect on their
organisational practices. Subsequent revisions to the interview scripts highlight contested areas
of the respective foundation’s work in China.
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domestic philanthropists, civil society practitioners, researchers, journalists,
bloggers, diplomats, government officials—and more ominously—security
personnel tasked with monitoring the activities of civil society actors in
mainland China. Empirical analysis will show how the interviews led to
surprising and counterintuitive results. Anyone can now read the interviews and
probe claims made by the foundation representatives. In their published form,
the interviews with leading foundation representatives have already enhanced
foundation transparency—and by extension—have also strengthened
foundation accountability.
Positions
Interviews with the foundation representatives typically revealed how close the
foundation was to the CCP, and how stable this position was. This is best
illustrated by the case of Oxfam Hong Kong, which the Chinese government
allegedly blacklisted from 2003 onwards for its strategic decision to not
cooperate with the party-state. It is an example of how a federated INGO got
into trouble by asserting itself politically against the CCP. Oxfam Hong Kong’s
case supports Chinese civil society practitioner Zhai Yan’s claim that in “terms
of the stakeholders the Chinese government is still the most important one. If
you do not manage this relationship well you could go down anytime” (Zhai,
2015).
During the field research, an informant told the author that Oxfam had
managed to be removed from this blacklist in 2008. Instead of talking about this
rather remarkable achievement, its China programme director, Howard Liu,
simply asserted that Oxfam aims to position itself within society and “that we
can have a very constructive cooperation with the Chinese government” (Liu,
2015). Dr Liu thus defined Oxfam as rooted in society, yet capable of engaging
with the party-state. A substantial repositioning had therefore taken place in
the past ten years.
Nevertheless, how did other interviewees position their foundations vis-à-vis
the party-state, market and civil society? The interviews showed that
foundations would collaborate exclusively with the party-state (SOCF), act as a
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bridge between party-state and civil society actors (CFPA, StC, RBS), primarily
support Chinese CSOs (NF, Misereor, Oxfam), or introduce management
approaches into China’s civil society sector (OF, SEE, CCAFC). The relative
distance, or close proximity, of a given foundation to the party-state should be
seen as only one of many yardsticks for critically assessing their roles. As
networked organisations, foundations not only engage with government
agencies but also relate to market and civil society actors. These relationships
are not static, but change over time. Alan Fowler has described the fluid nature
of the organisational relationship of what he terms “non-governmental
development organizations” (NGDO) as the “fourth position”. Fowler asserts
that as value-driven organisations, grant-making foundations “use their value-
base as a ‘springboard’ to interact with state, market, and civil society itself—
which is far from homogeneous and is not inherently ‘civil’ or conflict free”
(Fowler, 2003: 21). However, how can the “value bases” of foundations be
assessed, and what is their particular understanding of philanthropy?
Paradigms
Foundations have different value propositions, visions and missions, as well as
different theories of change which determine their philanthropic approaches.
The author argues that foundation leaders hold considerable sway when it
comes to positioning their organisations. This is why it is important to learn
about their paradigmatic thinking. When analysing the interviews the author
discerned three groups of foundation representatives, which either primarily
followed a conventional charity, a managerial philanthropic, or a political
philanthropic paradigm. In line with Lincoln/Guba, the author defines a
paradigm to mean “a systemic set of beliefs” (1985: 15). The published
interviews reveal the foundation representatives’ “world view, a general
perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world” (Patton,
1978: 203). Hinton and Groves’s heuristic framework, featuring nine criteria of
critical and dynamic choices for foundations as aid actors, enabled the author
to dissect the paradigmatic thinking of the interviewees. According to Hinton
and Groves (2004: 6), identifying an aid actor’s critical and dynamic choices
across a wider spectrum is preferable to “classifying organizations into one fixed
category”. What follows is a brief overview of the three paradigms.
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Table 1: Critical and Dynamic Choices for Foundations as Aid Actors
Criteria Conventional
Charity
Managerial
Philanthropy
Political
Philanthropy
1 Development
Approach
Benevolence “Participation”
and
“partnership”
Rights-based
approaches
2 Development
Methodology
Technical
process
Social process Political process
3 Core Concept
or Value
Doing good Effectiveness People’s rights
4 Primary
Stakeholders
Perceived as:
Beneficiaries Implementers Citizens
5 Accountability Upward
accountability
Upward with
some downward
Multiple
accountabilities
6 Relationship:
Aid Providers
to Recipients
Paternal Instrumental Empowering
7 Procedures Bureaucratic
conformity
Acceptance of
diversity
Negotiated
process
8 Organisational
Pressures
Pressure for
disbursement
Disbursement
and results
Results
and impact
9 Philosophy
of Change
Deterministic Open system Complex system
Note: Applied from Hinton and Groves (2004: 7).
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A first group of foundation representatives who primarily subscribe to a
conventional charity paradigm tend to depoliticise their work in China. They
describe their development approach in terms of gift-giving, benevolence or
welfare. Their preferred development methodology is based on technocratic
thinking. Their core concept or value is to “do good”. Primary stakeholders are
perceived as passive beneficiaries. In terms of accountability, the main focus is
on upward accountability to institutional donors, taxpayers, or individual
donors as foundation supporters. The relationship of aid providers to recipients
is paternalistic and framed in the language of providing funds and assistance.
Described organisational procedures suggest preference for bureaucratic
conformity. Organisational pressures often relate to the need to spend
allocated funding. The underlying philosophy of change is a deterministic and
closed system.
A second group of foundation representatives primarily follows a managerial
philanthropic paradigm. They are less concerned with whether they are doing
the “right thing”, and instead tend to focus on their performance. Such
foundation practitioners espouse private-sector values centred around
efficiency and effectiveness. In terms of the preferred development approach,
“participation” and “partnership” are used in constructivist terms. The
development methodology is framed as an emergent social process. Primary
stakeholders are perceived as implementers. There is a focus on upward
accountability, but also the recognition of some downward accountability
towards their grantees. In terms of the relationship between the aid provider
and recipients, the latter are seen as instrumental to the implementation of
specific programmes. Interviewees describe organisational procedures that are
more accepting of diversity. Organisational pressures exist in the form of finding
an appropriate balance between pressures for grant disbursement and results.
The underlying philosophy of change, however, is an open system which still
does not recognize the world’s complexity.
A third and final group of foundation representatives are primarily wedded to
a political philanthropic paradigm. They acknowledge the political dimension of
their work, and are highly reflective of their organisation’s practices. Being
political is not seen as confrontational or anti-state. Instead, such proponents
are acutely aware of the inherent power imbalance between grant-makers and
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CSO grantees. Interviews are used to highlight their foundation’s commitment
to rights-based approaches. The development methodology is seen as a
transformative political process, albeit not one that is geared towards regime
change. Primary stakeholders are not portrayed as passive recipients or
instrumental partners, but as citizens in their own right. Foundation
representatives following a political philanthropic paradigm are mindful of their
organisation’s multiple lines of accountability, which are upward, downward,
and horizontal (e.g. vis-à-vis international human rights monitors and other
communities of practice). In terms of the relationship of the aid provider to
recipients, the focus is on empowering people and influencing governments.
Organisational procedures are portrayed as a negotiated process.
Organisational pressures exist in the form of attaining results and impact
assessment. The underlying philosophy of change is a complex, non-
deterministic open system.
The interviews revealed that SOCF is the only organisation that primarily
follows the conventional charity paradigm. The other nine foreign and domestic
grant-making foundation representatives revealed either a primarily managerial
(RBS, OF, CCAFC, NF), or a primarily political (Misereor, CFPA, SEE, StC, Oxfam),
understanding of philanthropy. The author uses the qualifying term “primarily”
to emphasise that foundation representatives do not necessarily subscribe to
one of the three paradigms to the full extent. Instead, and as the empirical
discussion will show, they occasionally represent their foundation by referring
to criteria related to the other two paradigms.
The fluidity of foundation representatives’ paradigmatic thinking is best
illustrated by the interview with Mr Kantelhardt from Misereor. Kantelhardt
shied away from the language of rights-based approaches. Misereor also
seemed to have an instrumental view of public participation. And yet on
balance, the author learned that in the PRC, Misereor primarily follows a
political philanthropic paradigm. This became evident when reviewing
Kantelhardt’s interview answers. Kantelhardt presented Misereor’s
development approach in conventional charitable ways. When addressing the
criteria of development methodology, core concept or value, and
accountability, Misereor appeared to follow a managerial philanthropic
paradigm. Yet when addressing the relationship between the aid provider and
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recipients, organisational procedures, organisational pressures, and philosophy
of change, it became very clear that Misereor in fact follows a political
philanthropic paradigm.
When reviewing each of the interviews in detail, the author was struck by how
little the nationality, ethnicity or cultural background of the respective
foundation representative mattered in terms of the interviewee’s paradigmatic
thinking. It was a reminder that while foreign and domestic foundations are
subject to different regulatory regimes, in terms of reported organisational
practices, foreign and domestic foundations actually overlap in very significant
ways.
How did the foundation representatives describe the development approach
of their organisations? A majority of them argued that their foundation’s work
in the PRC was based on “participation” and “partnership” (OF, CCAFC, SEE,
CFPA, RBS). Only Liu Zhouhong from the Narada Foundation, Howard Liu from
Oxfam, and Perrine Lhuillier from StC framed their interviews in the more
explicit language of rights-based approaches. Duan Tao, from SOCF, and Wolf
Kantelhardt, from Misereor, subscribed to the development approach of gift
giving, benevolence and welfare.
The second criterion of development methodology helps shed light on the
foundations’ working practices. None of the representatives described their
foundation’s work in terms of a transformative political process. In an
authoritarian political context, such caution is not surprising. Instead, all
interviewees made the case that their development methodology is informed
by an emergent social process; only SOCF revealed a more technical and
blueprint-oriented understanding of its work.
The third criterion of core concepts or values is useful for discerning the “value
base” of foreign and domestic foundations. Here, a more mixed picture
emerged. In the case of foreign foundations, Shieh and Knutson identified
distinct motivations among INGOs that ranged from religious impulses and
humanitarian and ecological concerns to philanthropic ambitions (China
Development Brief, 2012: 5). There is less clarity, however, about value
orientations among Chinese foundations (Liu, [2010] 2011: 43). The
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developmental nature of domestic grant-making foundations thus makes it
difficult to compare and contrast the varying foundations’ guiding “axiomatic
values or ethics” (Edwards & Sen, 2000: 606). The interviews reveal a fairly even
split between foundation representatives who emphasise people’s rights
(CCAFC, NF, Oxfam, StC) and those who focus on the effectiveness and efficiency
of their work (OF, SEE, SOCF, CFPA, Misereor). Only Oliver Radtke (2015) framed
the work of the Robert Bosch Stiftung (RBS) in terms of “doing good”.
The fourth criterion, the perceptions of primary stakeholders, allows us to
identify how foundation representatives view “end users” in their philanthropic
work. Primary stakeholders can be understood either as implementers or
passive beneficiaries. However, the vast majority of foundation representatives
saw primary stakeholders as citizens (SEE, NF, CFPA, Oxfam, RBS, Misereor, StC);
only two framed them as implementers (OF, CCAFC). Again, SOCF proved to be
an outlier in terms of framing primary stakeholders as beneficiaries.
The fifth criterion helps to unearth the foundation representatives’ views on
the primary lines of accountability for their organisations. The interviews again
reveal a uniform picture. Two foundation representatives argued that their
organisations have to be “upward accountable”—to institutional donors,
taxpayers and individual donors as foundation supporters (SOCF, NF). While this
view was generally shared by other representatives, many suggested that in
addition to upward accountability, there also needs to be some downward
accountability, particularly to their grantees and primary stakeholders (OF,
CCAFC, SEE, CFPA, RBS, Misereor, StC). Howard Liu, from Oxfam, went further
than his counterparts by acknowledging their multiple accountabilities, both
upwards and downwards.
The sixth criterion, the relationship between aid providers and their recipients,
again puts the spotlight on the relative position of foundations vis-à-vis their
cooperating partners. From the interviews, two different camps emerged. Some
openly acknowledged their foundation’s ambition to influence the Chinese
government and to empower Chinese people (SEE, CFPA, Oxfam, StC), while
others saw the recipients as instrumental in implementing specific programmes
(OF, CCAFC, NF, RBS, Misereor). Wolf Kantelhardt is a case in point. He suggests
that public participation is important “in order to make a project successful. …
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It is a means to an end” (Kantelhardt, 2015). Again, only SOCF provided funds
and assistance itself, rather than devolving power to its cooperation partners.
Duan Tao makes the case that “[we] do not simply give money to an
organisation. Instead we are in charge of overall planning and organisation and
bringing all of the resources together” (Duan, 2015).
Nevertheless, how did foundation representatives reflect on their
organisational procedures? This seventh criterion addresses how the internal
governance of foundations is likely to affect their ability to engage with other
stakeholders. When reflecting on their organisational procedures, some
representatives described these as a negotiated process aimed at achieving
innovation and flexibility based on sociocultural sensitivity and knowledge (SEE,
CFPA, Oxfam, Misereor, StC). Others showed a fair amount of acceptance of
diversity in their work (OF, CCAFC, NF, RBS). SOCF again shows a great deal of
bureaucratic conformity, which is evident in its decision to form partnerships
almost exclusively with party-state organisations’ youth programmes, such as
the Communist Youth League or the Ideological and Political Secretariat of the
Ministry of Education. At no point does Duan Tao seem to mind that the SOCF’s
exclusive choice of partners was likely to strengthen the party-state at the
expense of other stakeholders. This example shows that, in foundations,
micropolitics determines “who gets what, when, how” (Lasswell, 1936).
The discussion so far has illustrated that the distinction between foundation
representatives following the charity paradigm and the managerial
philanthropic paradigm is fairly clear. There is arguably greater overlap between
the managerial and political philanthropic paradigm. The key criteria which sets
the two paradigms apart is the relationship of the aid provider to the recipient.
Here, the question of power takes centre stage.
Power
Whether a project should belong to a foundation (because of its role as a donor),
or be seen as the property of CSOs (because, after all, it implements the
initiative), highlights the tension between donorship and ownership. Are grant-
making foundations aware of the unequal power relationship that exists
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between donor and recipient (Brest & Harvey, 2008: 83)? If they are, how do
they deal with the issue of power imbalances in their grant-making processes?
Brest and Harvey (2008: 83) argued that “no relationship is more important
to a philanthropist than his or her relationship with a grantee.” They then
provided an extensive list of the ways in which grant-makers can sour this
relationship. For instance, they can do so by being unresponsive or abusive; by
raising false expectations among potential grantees, who put in considerable
work to present a grant proposal; by following cumbersome due diligence
processes that overburden applicants or grantees; and/or by abruptly leaving
an existing field of grant-making (Brest & Harvey, 2008: 83–4). Orosz has
formulated some of the “necessary qualities for fitness as a grant-maker”
(Orosz, 2000: 48), which include an emphasis on integrity, people skills,
analytical ability, creativity, spirituality, balance, a sense of proportion and
compassion (Orosz, 2000: 48–52).
In her interview, the founder and director of Huizeren, a Beijing-based
capacity building CSO, issued a scathing critique of Chinese corporate donors
and domestic grant-making foundations. She described them as utilitarian in
their approach to CSOs, having a neocolonial mindset and undermining CSO
autonomy through unreasonable grant conditionality (Zhai, 2015). Her critique
is mirrored in the Chinese CSOs’ 20 documented complaints published in the
aforementioned 2013 Foundation Rankings Award brochure. Chinese CSO
practitioners expressed their misgivings about grant-making foundations.
Among these reservations were excessive donorship, arrogance, unprofessional
behaviour, unrealistic resource allocation, low overheads, letting CSOs carry
unreasonable financial risks, ineffective project and financial management, and
lack of domestic support for legal aid and the rule-of-law. They also included
broken promises, the sudden cessation of funding, stolen project designs, taking
undue credit for CSO work, unclear property rights and unfair assessment of
CSO grantees (Zhongguo jijinhui pingjiabang, 2013: 32–35). Many specific
criticisms were explicitly levelled at domestic grant-making foundations, while
others included foreign foundations. Chinese civil society practitioners have also
criticised domestic foundations for being unprofessional, for being too informal
and for acting arbitrarily (Liu, [2009] 2011: 16).
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In the interviews, foundation representatives subscribing to a managerial
philanthropic paradigm emphasised the grant-maker’s donorship (NF, OF,
CCAFC). Liu Zhouhong, from the Narada Foundation, stated that “grantees need
to share the same goals as we do” (Liu, 2015). Foundation representatives
wedded to a political philanthropic paradigm, on the other hand, emphasized
the importance of the grantees’ ownership (Misereor and StC). Alternatively,
they saw donorship and ownership as a negotiated process between grant-
maker and grantee (SEE, CFPA, Oxfam). In the words of Wang Yi from the China
Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, “you need to want to do the project, and I
need to also want to do the project. If only one of us wants to do the project,
there might be no way for us to come together” (Wang, 2015). Different
attitudes to donorship and ownership thus provided a glimpse into the “value
bases” of foreign and domestic foundations.
The eighth criterion, organisational pressures, helps to illustrate how
foundation representatives perceive constraints in their work. Interviewees
either acknowledged the existing pressure for results and impact assessment
(OF, CCAFC, SEE, NF, CFPA, Oxfam, Misereor, StC), or suggested that a balance
needed to be found between pressures for disbursement and results (SOCF,
RBS).
Finally, foundation representatives also reflected on their respective
organisation’s philosophy of change—the ninth and final criterion—which the
majority (OF, CCAFC, SEE, NF, CFPA, Oxfam, Misereor, StC) defined in the
context of a complex, non-deterministic and open system. That SOCF and RBS
preferred to have government agencies as their main cooperation partners
suggested that these foundations aimed to achieve change within the narrow
confines of the party-state, without entertaining the possibility of contributing
to a more autonomous civil society. Li Hong subscribed to a developmental
perspective by stating that One Foundation programmes were providing “a
hatching and nurturing opportunity for … NGOs to grow” (Li, 2015). Meanwhile,
Liu Jingtao, from CCAFC, espoused a more prescriptive philosophy of change.
According to Liu, CCAFC encourages CSO-led public participation, calls on more
private foundations to join its United Way programme, and advocates
introducing legal changes to allow foundations to register more easily and to
engage in public fundraising (Liu, 2015). Other domestic foundation
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representatives (NF, CFPA) echoed the call to relax governmental curbs on
foundations and CSOs engaging in public fundraising. However, SEE called for
the redistribution of risks and for wealthy or resourceful Chinese citizens to bear
greater social and environmental responsibility (Guo, 2015). Both Oxfam and
Misereor took a distinctive bottom–up approach—one that either focused on
rights-based approaches, as in the case of Oxfam (Liu, 2015), or one that
emphasised the importance of individual citizens becoming more active in their
local communities, as in the case of Misereor (Kantelhardt, 2015). The emphasis
on the individual was also at the heart of RBS operations in China (Radtke, 2015).
StC, on the other hand, stressed the value of bringing in international expertise
and good practices. It advocated a philosophy of change that included building
the capacity of people, system strengthening and organisational capacity
building for CSOs, and policy advocacy (Lhuillier, 2015).
Conclusion
The review of development trajectories, legal statuses and modes of operation
showed that foreign foundations managed to carve out a niche in China despite
political restrictions. Domestic foundations, on the other hand, were able to
thrive due to an enabling policy environment. They took advantage of the 2004
foundation regulations and could exponentially enlarge their financial resource
base with the help of public fundraising licences. China’s Overseas NGO Law, as
well as the Charity Law, will open further avenues for domestic foundations to
grow at the expense of foreign foundations.
The empirical part of this article reflected on the views of foundation
representatives on foundation positions, paradigms and power. The interviews
revealed that foundation representatives subscribed to either a managerial
(RBS, OF, CCAFC, NF) or a political (Misereor, CFPA, SEE, StC, Oxfam)
understanding of philanthropy. This suggests that in the foreseeable future, two
groups of philanthropic foundations will coexist—an emerging group of
managerial philanthropists aiming to introduce management approaches to
China’s civil society sector, and more politically minded philanthropists aiming
to bridge the gap between party-state and civil society actors. One of the
greatest legacies of international giving to China’s civil society has been human
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capital, namely the local people who are now leaders of organisations across
China, who have learned a great deal from the exchange of models and
information with foreign funders and implementers (Fulda, 2016). It is therefore
encouraging to see that domestic grant-making foundations, such as SEE and
CFPA, the latter being a modernising GONGO, have already developed into
highly reflective organisations that are capable of continuous adaptation and
organisational learning. The interviews with Guo Xia and Wang Yi are indicative
of the long journey that some domestic foundations have taken in a relatively
short space of time.
Applying Hinton and Groves’s heuristic framework of critical and dynamic
choices for foundations as aid actors allowed the author to discern the
paradigmatic thinking among interviewed foundation representatives. When
applying this heuristic framework, the author learned that interviewees
generally erred on the side of caution. Mindful of the shadow of the Chinese
party-state, interviewees de-emphasised the political nature of their work. After
concluding one of the interviews, a foundation representative admitted to the
author that the interviewee had deliberately presented the foundation in
managerial rather than political terms, and suggested that this was to protect
the foundation in politically challenging times.
The research conducted in 2014 has revealed a foundation field in transition.
As China’s Overseas NGO law has come into effect on 1 January 2017, the
foundation landscape is likely to evolve even further. Future research will have
to investigate the impacts of the law on foundations and their grantees. How
will foreign foundations cope under the new regulatory regime? Will they divest
from the PRC, seeing the new regulations as too burdensome? If significant
numbers of foreign foundations were to leave China, will more domestic
foundations become grant-makers for Chinese CSOs? And how will the law
affect the foreign foundations that remain active in China? Will they become
more conventional or managerial, in terms of their paradigmatic choices? Or
will the law trigger a politicisation of the foundation field?
This research aimed to address a gap in the literature that so far has largely
ignored the foundation–CSO relationship in the PRC. A new and innovative
conceptual approach was employed to study foreign and domestic foundations
Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies 89
operating under authoritarian conditions. This research can lead to a new
paradigm in foundation research since it overcomes the current tendency to
treat domestic and foreign foundations as separate—and thus seemingly
incomparable—entities. Since the political space available for civil society in
countries as disparate as India, Israel, Russia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and
Cambodia is increasingly being restricted by draconian NGO laws (Fulda, 2017),
the question of convergence and divergence between foreign and domestic
foundations can now also be analysed in other regional contexts. The successful
application of this framework in the case of the PRC can help set the research
agenda for future foundation research. Comparative social and political
scientists should feel encouraged to use the new concepts and research
approaches, and to apply them to their own research on foreign and domestic
foundations in other authoritarian contexts.
Appendix: Foundation Profiles
Sino-Ocean Charity Foundation (SOCF)
This private foundation received an endowment of ¥2 million in 2008 from the
property development company Sino-Ocean Land. In 2014, its parent company
held net assets of ¥132 billion. The Sino-Ocean Charity Foundation aims to
educate its staff about issues relating to education and environmental
protection through its own CSR projects. In its education projects, SOCF
primarily collaborates with the Communist Youth League and the Ideological
and Political Secretariat of the Ministry of Education. The latter party-state
organs provide access to schools and universities. There is very limited
cooperation with selected GONGOs and INGOs—six CSOs in 2011 and four in
2013. SOCF is not licensed to engage in public fundraising.
Robert Bosch Stiftung (RBS)
This German industry foundation was established in 1964 with the mission to
engage in the fields of health, international relations, society, education, culture
and science. In 2013, the Robert Bosch Stiftung (RBS) held net assets of €5.23
billion, with €36.11 billion in operating reserves. The foundation’s China
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engagement started with the establishment of a focus on German–Chinese
relations in 2006. By 2013, RBS had spent €1.86 million on 12 projects in this
focus area. RBS engages with government agencies, grassroots NGOs, GONGOs
and universities in the PRC through German intermediaries such as the
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH or
Stiftung Asienhaus. Support for Chinese grassroots NGOs is provided primarily
through an exchange programme for European and Chinese NGO personnel.
RBS is not licensed to engage in public fundraising in the PRC.
One Foundation (OF)
Established with an endowment of ¥50 million in 2010, the One Foundation
engages in the areas of safety/disasters, children, voluntarism, mental health
and philanthropy development. It was the first private foundation to be
registered as an independent public charitable fundraising organisation in the
PRC. In 2014, its net assets were ¥408 million. The same year, it raised ¥168
million from 4,470,000 individual donors as well as 88 corporate and
government donors. In 2014, the OF spent ¥224 million, with the vast majority
of it going to grants for disaster relief (¥199,125,178) and the remainder spent
on philanthropy development (¥15,469,156) and child welfare (¥9,520,952). It
supports both GONGOs and grassroots NGOs. About 600 grassroots NGOs have
been supported annually between 2011 and 2013. OF provides seed funding for
CSOs.
China Charities Aid Foundation for Children (CCAFC)
The China Charities Aid Foundation for Children was established in 2009 with an
endowment of ¥20 million. It is primarily active in the fields of education,
medical care, youth, children, poverty alleviation, mental health and
philanthropy development. It emphasises service delivery and promotes a
Chinese variation of the US-based fundraising approach, United Way. CCAFC is
licensed to engage in public fundraising. In 2014 it raised ¥94.65 million.
Individual donors raised 56 per cent; the remaining 44 per cent came from
corporate donors. CCAFC spent all the funds it raised on grants for independent
projects (¥49,320,500), special funds (¥40,476,100) and cooperation projects
(¥4,856,900). It supports GONGOs and grassroots NGOs. In 2014 it had 300
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grantees, 90 per cent of which were grassroots NGOs and 10 per cent GONGOs.
Seed funding for Chinese CSOs is planned for the future.
Narada Foundation (NF)
The Narada Foundation was established in 2007 with an endowment of ¥100
million. Its activity areas include education, youth entrepreneurship,
safety/disasters, voluntarism and philanthropy development. In 2014 it held net
assets worth ¥132 million. The NF is not licensed to engage in public fundraising.
In 2014, it spent most of its ¥28 million income on its disaster reconstruction
fund (¥10,000,000), macro-level projects (¥2,584,516), strategic projects
(¥2,040,000), specific public interest projects (¥3,180,010) and research
projects (¥268,274). While the NF claims to support grassroots NGOs, the
number of individual grantees is actually limited. For example, there have been
67 Ginkgo Fellows since 2010 and a few selected grassroots NGOs, but only four
new CSOs were supported by the Bright Way Programme in 2014. Narada is also
the China Foundation Centre’s principal sponsor.
Misereor
Established in 1958, this German Catholic grant-making foundation is active in
the fields of poverty alleviation, community development, education, social
work, policy advocacy and public education. In 2013, Misereor held net assets
of €99.9 million, with operating reserves of €66.5 million. The same year most
of its income of €179.3 million was raised from German federal government
donors (€115.1 million), whereas the remainder came from individual donors
(€54.3 million). In 2014, Misereor spent three million euros on 65 projects in the
PRC, which included 25 new projects. The funding ratio is about 1:1:1 in terms
of its support for church-based organisations such as dioceses (33 per cent),
grassroots NGOs (33 per cent), as well as GONGOs and research institutes at
universities (33 per cent). In the PRC, Misereor emphasises service provision and
individual empowerment. It is not licensed to engage in public fundraising in the
PRC.
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China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA)
One of Misereor’s key cooperation partners, the China Foundation for Poverty
Alleviation, was established with an endowment of ¥10 million in 1989. It
operates in the fields of education, medical care, agriculture, rural areas and
farmers, safety/disasters, women, children, international affairs and poverty
alleviation. In 2014, it held net assets of ¥2.21 billion. CFPA is licensed to engage
in public fundraising. In 2014 its financial income amounted to ¥3.51 billion,
including micro-credits. Some ¥613 million was raised through donations. That
same year, CFPA spent ¥410 million (without micro-credits) or ¥2.57 billion
(with micro-credits). CFPA has supported grassroots NGOs and individuals
through micro-credit schemes. From August 2013 until the end of December
2014, it supported CSOs through 35 philanthropic projects amounting to ¥6.22
million. CFPA does not provide seed funding for CSOs.
SEE Foundation (SEE)
The SEE Foundation was established in 2008 with an endowment of ¥8 million.
In 2014, its net assets were ¥47.19 million. It engages in the fields of the
environment, scientific research and philanthropy development. It is licensed to
engage in public fundraising. In 2014, it raised ¥42.98 million from individual
donors and ¥5.76 million from other foundations. Almost all the money it raised
was allocated to grants for combatting desertification (¥21,480,416), specific
environmental protection projects (¥19,243,368) and environmental public
participation projects (¥6,548,078). With its emphasis on environmental
protection and philanthropy development, SEE has supported both GONGOs
and grassroots NGOs. Most of its 1,000 grantees have been grassroots NGOs. It
provides seed funding for CSOs, for example, Green House Plan (¥200,000 per
year for 70 CSOs since 2012).
Save the Children (StC)
Save the Children is a grant-making foundation with a very long organisational
history. Established in 1919, it focuses on humanitarian aid, education, child
poverty, child welfare, hunger and child protection. In 2013, its endowment
stood at £2.92 million, while it boasted an operation surplus of £34.76 million.
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While StC is not licensed to engage in public fundraising within the PRC, in 2013
it raised £109.71 million from individual donors, and £186.92 million from
institutional grants globally. That same year it spent £267.17 million worldwide.
In the PRC, it allocated £7.59 million to grants for child education (39.3 per cent),
child health (24.5 per cent), disaster risk reduction and emergency (18.2 per
cent), child protection (17.7 per cent), and child rights governance (0.3 per
cent). StC supports grassroots NGOs, GONGOs, government agencies and
universities. Support for Chinese CSOs excludes seed funding.
Oxfam Hong Kong
Oxfam Hong Kong was established in 1976. Operating under a highly federated
structure, it has been engaging the PRC since 1987. In mainland China, Oxfam
Hong Kong is primarily concerned with poverty alleviation, development,
humanitarian aid, policy advocacy and public education. In the financial year
2013/14, Oxfam Hong Kong-restricted funds amounted to HK$8.4 million, and
its operating reserves that year were HK$169.7. It generated an income of
HK$255.9 million, of which HK$110 million was spent on 620 projects in the PRC,
which included 211 new projects. Oxfam Hong Kong supports grassroots NGOs,
GONGOs, government agencies and universities. Its 620 projects and
programmes are implemented with the help of 266 partners in 24 provinces.
Support for Chinese CSOs includes seed funding.
References
Anheier, Helmut K. and Diana Leat (2002), From Charity to Creativity:
Philanthropic Foundations in the 21st Century: Perspectives from Britain
and Beyond, Bournes Green, Glos.: Comedia.
—— (2006), Creative Philanthropy: Toward a New Philanthropy for the Twenty-
First Century, London: Routledge.
Bandurski, David (2013), “Control, on the Shores of China’s Dream”, China
Media Project, available at: http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/05/22/33193/
(accessed 09.01.2017).
Bartley, Tim (2007), “How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The
Construction of an Organizational Field and the Rise of Forest Certification”,
94 Andreas Fulda
Social Problems 54(3): 229–55.
Brest, Paul and Hal Harvey (2008), Money Well Spent: A Strategic Plan for Smart
Philanthropy, New York: Bloomberg.
Chen, Jie (2012), Transnational Civil Society in China: Intrusion and Impact,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Chen, Lincoln C., Jennifer Ryan and Tony Saich (2014), “Introduction:
Philanthropy for Health in China: Distinctive Roots and Future Prospects”,
1-15, in Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds.), Philanthropy
for Health in China, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Chin, Josh (2016), “The Good—And Bad—About China’s New Charity Law”,
China Real Time Report, March 16, available at:
https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/03/16/the-good-and-bad-
about-chinas-new-charity-law/ (accessed 27.06.17).
China Development Brief (2012), “Special Report: The Roles and Challenges of
International NGOs in China’s Development”, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/publications/special-report-the-roles-
and-challenges-of-international-ngos-in-chinas-development/ (accessed
09.01.2017).
China Development Brief (2013), Chinese NGO Directory: 251 NGO Profiles and
a Special Report: China’s Civil Society in the Making, Beijing: China
Development Brief.
China Development Brief and Geneva Global (2015), “Thinking Strategically
about Civil Society Assistance in China”, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/publications/thinking-strategically-
about-civil-society-assistance-in-china/ (accessed 09.01.2017).
ChinaFile (trans.) (2013), “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation: How Much is a
Hardline Party Directive Shaping China’s Current Political Climate?”,
ChinaFile, available at: www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-
translation#start (accessed 9 January 2017).
Deng, Guosheng (2013), “The Decline of Foreign Aid and the Dilemma of the
Chinese Grassroots NGOs”, Religions & Christianity in Today’s China 3(1):
24–31.
Duan, Tao (2015), interview by the author, July 22 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Duan-Tao-Sino-Ocean-Charity-
Foundation-EN.pdf (accessed 10.07.17).
Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies 95
Edwards, Michael and Gita Sen (2000), “NGOs, Social Change and the
Transformation of Human Relationships”, Third World Quarterly 21(4):
605–16.
Fetter, Holly E. (2013), “From DC to the PRC: Examining the Strategies and
Consequences of US Funding for Chinese Civil Society”, undergraduate
thesis, Stanford University.
Fowler, Alan (2003), “NGO Futures—Beyond Aid: NGDO Values and the Fourth
Position”, 13-26, in Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler (eds.), The Earthscan
Reader on NGO Management, Abingdon: Earthscan.
Fulda, Andreas (2015), “Civil Society Contributions to Policy Innovation in the
PRC”, 3-30, in Andreas Fulda (ed.), Civil Society Contributions to Policy
Innovation in the PR China, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
—— (2017), “A New Law in China is Threatening the Work of International
NGOs”, The Conversation, available at: https://theconversation.com/a-
new-law-in-china-is-threatening-the-workof-international-ngos-70884
(accessed 09.01.2017).
Fulda, Andreas and Jennifer Brady (2016), “How Foreign Non-Profit
Organisations Should Respond to China’s New Overseas NGO Management
Law”, China Policy Institute Policy Paper 2016: No. 1, available at:
www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/policypapers/china-policy-
institute-policy-paper-2016-no-1-fuldabrady.pdf (accessed 09.01.2017).
Guo, Xia (2015), interview by the author, July 14 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Interview-with-Guo-Xia-SEE-Alashan-
Foundation-EN.pdf (accessed 10.07.17).
Hasmath, Reza, Timothy Hildebrandt and Jennifer Hsu (2016), “Conceptualizing
Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations”, paper
presented at the Development Studies Association Annual Meeting
(Oxford, UK), 12-14 September.
Hildebrandt, Timothy (2013), Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State
in China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hinton, Rachel and Leslie Groves (2004), “The Complexity of Inclusive Aid”, 3-
20, in Leslie Groves and Rachel Hinton (eds.), Inclusive Aid: Changing Power
and Relationships in International Development, London: Earthscan.
Howell, J. (2012). “Civil Society, Corporatism and Capitalism in China”, The
Journal of Comparative Asian Development, 11 (2): 271-297.
96 Andreas Fulda
Hsu, Jennifer Y.J. and Reza Hasmath (2014), “The Local Corporatist State and
NGO Relations in China”, Journal of Contemporary China, 23(87): 516–34.
Huang, Haoming (2015), interview by the author, July 9 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Huang-Haoming-China-
Association-for-NGO-Cooperation-EN.pdf (accessed 10.07.17).
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2016), “NGO Law Monitor: China”,
available at: www.icnl.org/research/monitor/china.html (accessed
09.01.2017).
Jijinhui zhongxin wang (2017), “Shuju Zhongxin” (Data centre), available at:
http://data.foundationcenter.org.cn/foundation.html (accessed
21.06.2017).
Kantelhardt, Wolf (2015), interview by the author, July 23 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Wolf-Kantelhardt-Misereor-
EN.pdf (accessed 10.07.17).
Lai, Weijun, Jiangang Zhu, Lin Tao and Anthony Spires (2015), “Bounded by the
State: Government Priorities and the Development of Private Philanthropic
Foundations in China”, The China Quarterly, 224: 1083–92.
Lasswell, Harold D. (1936), Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, New York:
Whittlesey House.
Lhuillier, Perine (2015), interview by the author, July 23 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Perrine-Lhuillier-Save-the-
Children-EN.pdf (accessed 10.07.17).
Li, Hong (2015), interview by the author, July 21 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Li-Hong-One-Foundation-EN.pdf
(accessed 10.07.17).
Lilja, Elisabeth (2015), “A New Ecology of Civil Society”, Journal of Civil Society,
11(2): 117–22.
Lincoln, Yvonna S. and Egon G. Guba (1985), Naturalistic Inquiry, London: Sage
Publications.
Liu, Haiying ([2009] 2011), “The Impact of Private Foundations on Domestic
NGOs in China”, 10-18, Special Issue: New Trends in Philanthropy and Civil
Society in China, Beijing: China Development Brief.
Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies 97
—— ([2010] 2011), “Different Opinions at the Second Private Foundation
Forum”, 39-44, Special Issue: New Trends in Philanthropy and Civil Society
in China, Beijing: China Development Brief.
Liu, Howard (2015), interview by the author, July 28 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Howard-Liu-OXFAM-EN.pdf
(accessed 10.07.17).
Liu, Jingtao (2015), interview by the author, July 8 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Liu-Jingtao-China-Charities-Aid-
Foundation-for-Children-EN.pdf (accessed 10.07.17).
Liu, Zhouhong (2015), interview by the author, July 8 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Liu-Zhouhoung-Narada-
Foundation-EN.pdf (accessed 10.07.17).
Loubere, Nicholas (2017), “Questioning Transcription: The Case for the
Systematic and Reflexive Interviewing and Reporting (SRIR)
Method”, Forum: Qualitative Social Research, available at:
http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/2739/4109 (accessed 27.06.17).
OECD (2003), “Philanthropic Foundations and Development Co-operation”,
OECD Journal on Development 4(3): 73-148.
Orosz, Joel (2000), The Insider’s Guide to Grantmaking: How Foundations Find,
Fund and Manage Effective Programs, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Oxfam (2015), “Mainland China”, available at:
www.oxfam.org.hk/en/china.aspx (accessed 09.01.2017).
Patton, Michael (1978), Qualitative Evaluation Methods, Beverly Hills, Sage.
Porter, Michael E. and Mark R. Kramer (1999), “Philanthropy’s New Agenda:
Creating Value”, Harvard Business Review, available at:
https://hbr.org/1999/11/philanthropys-new-agenda-creating-value
(accessed 09.01.2017).
Radtke, Oliver (2015), interview by the author, August 7 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Interview-with-Oliver-Radtke-Robert-Bosch-
Foundation-EN.pdf (accessed 10.07.17).
Smith, Joanna H. (2009), The Art of Doing Good: Charity in Late Ming China,
98 Andreas Fulda
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Spires, Anthony J. (2012), “Lessons from Abroad: Foreign Influences on China’s
Emerging Civil Society”, The China Journal, 68: 125–46.
Teets, J. (2014), Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Borgen Project (2016), “China’s New Charity Law”, available online:
https://borgenproject.org/chinas-new-charity-law/ (accessed 27.06.17).
Tsu, Yu Yue (1912), The Spirit of Chinese Philanthropy: A Study in Mutual Aid,
New York: Columbia University.
Wang, Yi (2015), interview by the author, July 24 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Wang-Yi-China-Foundation-for-
Porverty-Alleviation-EN.pdf (accessed 10.07.17).
White, Gordon, Jude Howell and Xiaoyuan Shang (1996), In Search of Civil
Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Wielander, Gerda (2013), Christian Values in Communist China, Oxon:
Routledge.
Xu, Yongguang (2014), “Toward a Healthier Philanthropy: Reforming China’s
Philanthropic Sector”, 268-280, in Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony
Saich (eds.), Philanthropy for Health in China, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Yu, Miles (2016), “Soros vs. China”, The Washington Times, January 28, available
at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/28/inside-china-
george-soros-vs-china/ (accessed 20.06.2017).
Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie (2005), “Making Things Public.
Atmospheres of Democracy”, ZKM Karlsruhe, available at:
http://on1.zkm.de/zkm/stories/storyReader$4581 (accessed 11.07.17).
Zhai, Yan (2015), interview by the author, July 15 2014, available at:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Interview-with-Zhai-Yan-Huizeren-EN.pdf
(accessed 10.07.17).
Zhang, Xiulan and Lu Zhang (2014), “Medicine with a Mission: Chinese Roots and
Foreign Engagement in Health Philanthropy”, 83-100, in Jennifer Ryan,
Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds.), Philanthropy for Health in China,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies 99
Zhongguo jijinhui pingjiabang (2013), “Pingjiabang: Zhongguo jijinhui
pingjiabang” (Evaluation rankings: China foundation evaluation rankings),
available at:
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/upload/userfiles/files/cf%20re
port.pdf (accessed 09.07.17).
Andreas Fulda is Assistant Professor in the School of Politics and International
Relations at the University of Nottingham. He would like to thank Jennifer
Brady, Edmund Cheng, Horst Fabian, Fu Tao, Gerhard Fulda, Elizabeth Knup,
Nicola Macbean, Flora Sapio, and Patrick Schroeder, as well as the
anonymous reviewers, for comments on earlier versions of this paper.
